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 Abstract 
How does a major international company learn? In particular, how does a successful 
international company even discover that it needs to learn to do things differently, 
and to do different things, rather than relying on its past recipes for success?  
According to the literature, success tends to be a hindrance for learning, while crises 
tend to stimulate it by calling into question existing ways of seeing and doing things.  
The analysis of the far-ranging transformation of Hoechst into Aventis in the years 
1994 to 2000 challenges and refines some concepts in the literature on organi-
zational learning. The case illustrates how learning was triggered in a successful 
organization without waiting for a crisis, how double-loop learning was achieved 
through mergers and acquisitions, and how unlearning was managed in divestments.  
The paper modifies theories on the nature of visions and the role of top managers in 
creating visions, and it breaks some new ground in the exploration of the role of 
organizational politics in organizational learning processes. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Wie lernt ein großes, internationales Unternehmen? Und wie erkennt insbesondere 
ein erfolgreiches, internationales Unternehmen, dass es lernen muss, neue Ziele und 
Arbeitsweisen zu entwickeln, statt auf altbewährte Rezepte für den Erfolg zurück-
zugreifen? Erfolg wird in der Fachliteratur als wesentliches Hindernis für das Lernen 
dargestellt, während Krisen Lernen fördern, indem sie die Mitglieder einer Organisa-
tion mit der Notwendigkeit konfrontieren, bestehende Sichtweisen und Handlungs-
muster zu hinterfragen. Die Analyse des weitreichenden Transformationsprozess 
zwischen 1994 und 2000 von Hoechst zu Aventis ermöglicht es, einige wichtige 
Elemente der Organisationslerntheorien zu revidieren und zu präzisieren. Dieser Fall 
zeigt z.B., wie Lernen in einer erfolgreichen Organisation ausgelöst wurde, ohne auf 
eine Krise zu warten. Darüber hinaus erlaubt der Hoechst-Aventis Fall Einblicke in 
die Operationalisierung zweier wichtiger Lernformen, die in der Literatur häufig 
genannt aber selten empirisch nachgewiesen werden, nämlich Reflexives Lernen 
(double loop learning) und Entlernen (unlearning). Aus dieser Arbeit lassen sich 
darüber hinaus neue Erkenntnisse über die Entstehung und Wirkungsweise von 
Leitbildern in Organisationslernen und über mikropolitische Dimensionen von 
Organisationslernprozessen ableiten. 
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Introduction∗ 
How does a major international company learn? In particular, how does a successful 
international company even discover that it needs to learn to do things differently, 
and to do different things, rather than relying on its past recipes for success?  
According to the literature, success tends to be a hindrance for learning, while crises 
tend to stimulate it by calling into question existing ways of seeing and doing things 
(Berthoin Antal, Dierkes & Marz 1999; Starbuck & Hedberg 2001).  The far-ranging 
transformation of Hoechst into Aventis in the years 1994 to 2000 challenges and 
refines some concepts in the literature on organizational learning.   
 
Hoechst was the largest chemical-pharmaceutical company in Germany and in the 
world.  At the end of 1993, the year before the transformation process was initiated, 
the company had posted an operating profit of € 770 million on sales of € 23.5 billion.  
It had 172,000 employees working in 120 countries. The scale of its international 
activities was considerable: three quarters of its turnover was generated abroad.  It 
pursued research in 17 countries and dedicated a higher percentage of its budget to 
research than the industry average.  The portfolio was broadly diversified, with 
activities in chemicals (accounting for 27% of sales), health (24%), fibers (15%), 
polymers (14%), engineering and technology (12%) and agriculture (8%).  Hoechst 
was a company with a long history of success and it appeared to be strong and well 
equipped for the future.  However, instead of continuing along the same lines, the 
Hoechst management undertook major changes and forced the company to learn 
many new ideas and competences.  As a result, by the end of 1999, Hoechst had all 
but ceased to exist, but its managers could boast of having successfully positioned 
its component businesses on the threshold of the new millennium.  The 
pharmaceutical and agricultural divisions had been transformed with a European 
partner, Rhône-Poulenc, into a new multinational corporation under French law, 
Aventis SA, focused on life sciences.  The divested specialty chemicals were doing 
well under the banner of Clariant, and basic chemicals were prospering at the spin-
off company, Celanese.  In 1999 the Aventis Group reported an operating profit of 
                                                 
∗  The authors would like to thank Holger Straßheim and Michael Wortmann for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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€2.7 billion on sales of €20.4 billion. It achieved these results with 44% fewer 
employees than it had in 1994 (Hoechst 1995, Aventis 2000). The research budget of 
€ 2.38 billion put Aventis to the top of the list among its world-class competitors.  
 
A comparison between Hoechst in 1994 and at the end of 1999 suggests that the 
scope of the transformation spans the full range of learning forms identified by 
Argyris & Schön (1978): single loop learning, double loop learning and even deutero 
learning.  The company learned not only to improve existing processes but also to re-
think its overall purpose, and to embed learning into its vision, culture and structure.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that Hoechst had unlearned (Hedberg 1981) some of 
the things that had made it successful in the past but were impeding its ability to deal 
appropriately with emerging challenges.  For example, it left behind its roots in the 
chemical industry and “unlearned” its assumption that success required a diversified 
portfolio, disentangling itself from all business activities that did not fit under the 
heading of “life sciences.”  It learned to let go of its exclusively German-based 
decision-making culture by reconfiguring its top management to include non-
Germans and by shrinking from a very large bureaucratic headquarter to a small 
head office staff in Strasbourg (assigning greater decentral responsibility to business 
units, also with international managers at the helm) .  It also learned how to change 
its knowledge base and improve its research and development function, thereby 
strengthening the pipeline of products and speeding up their entry into the market.  
Thus, it embarked on the possibly most important type of learning in the 
pharmaceutical industry: knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995), and here, 
too, Hoechst made visible progress during the period 1994-1999.  
 
An analysis of the transformation of Hoechst provides insights into a number of key 
concepts and factors enabling organizational learning. In addition to generating a 
better understanding of the role of success and crises in triggering organizational 
learning, the case of Hoechst offers a platform for studying the role of leadership, 
visions, and mergers and acquisitions in learning processes. It thereby provides not 
only a rich case for developing a deeper understanding of key issues in organiza-
tional learning, but also guidance to practitioners for setting learning processes in 
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motion, for building the coalitions needed to maintain the momentum for change, and 
for changing the knowledge base of the organization.  
Triggering Organizational Learning 
What set this multiple learning process into motion at the apparently successful 
Hoechst? The most obvious answer is the arrival of a new CEO, Jürgen Dormann, 
who took the helm of Hoechst AG as Chairman of the Management Board in April, 
1994.  But this answer is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: First, Dormann’s 
background and management style did not correspond to the received wisdom about 
the kind of leaders who are needed for major organizational change.  He was an 
insider who had joined the company as a management trainee in 1963, so did not 
bring the fresh perspective and independence of thought that an externally recruited 
CEO with a track record of making change happen in other companies is expected to 
bring.  His personal style was low-key and more effective in communicating with 
small groups than with large ones.  Second, attributing everything to the arrival of a 
single person, no matter how skilled and gifted he may be, is a simplistic 
overestimation of the power of any leader.  It is therefore necessary to look more 
carefully and discover what made it possible for Dormann’s arrival as CEO to have 
such an impact at a time when the company was doing well and had no immediate 
pressure to engage in double loop learning or in unlearning past recipes for success.  
The key factors that served to trigger organizational learning in the absence of a 
generally shared sense of serious immediate crisis were Dormann’s skill at creating a 
sense of urgency for change, supported by the introduction of new perspectives into 
top management thinking, and the formation of powerful coalitions to make change 
happen. 
Creating a Sense of Urgency 
Even before taking over as CEO Dormann made no secret about the fact that he 
wanted to make some changes, challenge established ways of thinking in Hoechst, 
and shake up longstanding power bases.  Unlike his predecessors, he was not a 
chemist by training, and although he had not lived and worked abroad, he had gained 
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an international perspective through his responsibilities for the U.S. subsidiaries, 
most particularly through the successful acquisition of Celanese in 1987.  He saw 
Hoechst through different eyes than his predecessors.  As he later explained 
succinctly, “Hoechst was German-rooted, strongly science-based, not very market-
oriented, very introverted, very academic.  We had to change that.”1 
 
Although Hoechst seemed to be strong, he believed that it would face major 
problems in the future if it did not change.  He was well aware of critical voices 
pointing to weaknesses in the company, weaknesses that could endanger its future 
competitiveness on world markets.  Of particular concern, as the business press 
noted, was the fact that the pharmaceutical division “... the former pearl and profit 
dynamo of the company has fallen behind the international competition, because for 
years it has been fixated on its expensive but not sufficiently innovative research.”  
(Rüßmann 1990: 37, our translation).  Within the German context, Hoechst was a 
highly respected company, with a 125-year history, but compared with multinationals 
on the world stage, Hoechst was “a sort of elder statesman” that was “operating in a 
staid and unspectacular manner” (Taggart 1993: 360).  Although some of his senior 
colleagues on the Management Board believed that Hoechst could ride out the dip in 
profits in the pharmaceuticals area because they had seen the company deal with 
cyclical downturns in the past, Dormann was not willing to wait for problems to 
multiply and grow into a full-blown crisis before shaking the company out of its 
complacency.  He understood the need to address the problems head on and to 
create a sense of urgency for change. 
 
Having seen how recent attempts to achieve change in the company had become 
stuck because they did not have the buy-in from enough key players, Dormann 
officially kicked off the transformation process by giving a major speech to the top 
120 senior executives of Hoechst and the general managers of the associated 
companies in Europe. He called it “Aufbruch `94,” and this German word for “new 
                                                 
1  Unless otherwise indicated, quotations come from the interviews we conducted during our study 
of the transformation of Hoechst to Aventis. See the two-part case study and teaching note by 
Berthoin Antal in collaboration with Dierkes, Krebsbach-Gnath and Nonaka 2001; Berthoin Antal, 
Dierkes, Krebsbach-Gnath, & Nonaka 2001; and Berthoin Antal & Herbolzeimer 2001. 
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beginnings” soon entered the standard vocabulary of Hoechst managers in many 
different countries.  The speech that he gave reverberated through the halls and 
offices of Hoechst around the world. The urgency was clear.  Dormann demonstrated 
that although current results were good, there had been drops in performance in 
several business areas and the international competition was stronger and more 
efficient in both research and sales. He spoke of the need to grab the opportunity for 
change, and he outlined key issues he intended to tackle in order to become one of 
the top three companies in whatever business the company decided to pursue. He 
also expressed the belief that many people in the company – and the external 
stakeholders – were expecting significant change, so he thought he could count on 
their energy and commitment.  
Acquiring Knowledge and New Perspectives 
Dormann realized that the sense of urgency for change had to be broadly shared in 
the organization in order to ensure that people would become aware of the need to 
manage the company differently.  To achieve this, he set up a task force to analyze 
the strengths and weaknesses of Hoechst worldwide and to come up with 
recommendations in six months’ time.  The group was therefore under time pressure 
to learn and to generate recommendations.   
 
Dormann challenged conventional wisdom in composing his task force for the 
Aufbruch `94.  He did not outsource the analysis to consultants, nor did he assign the 
responsibility to the most senior managers who would automatically have had the 
visibility and clout to make things happen in the organization.  Instead, he selected 
second and third level managers from different Hoechst businesses all around the 
world, individuals he had come to know and respect. One of the members later 
commented: “If you look at the combination that was in the group, the interesting part 
was that many people were from the periphery.”  In other words, Dormann chose 
“internal outsiders” (Berthoin Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath 2002) to bring in new 
perspectives into the analysis of Hoechst’s strengths and weaknesses and into the 
formulation of concepts for the future.  
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Surprisingly for a traditional German-based company, several of the task force 
members were non-Germans.  For example, there was Ernie Drew, CEO of Hoechst 
Celanese, who had come to Hoechst with the acquisition of Celanese in 1987,  
Claudio Sonder, who was responsible for Hoechst’s Latin American operations, and 
Bill Harris, who headed the fibers business in the U.S.. Thomas Hofstaetter also 
participated, bringing in his experience from Asia, where he ran the pharmaceutical 
business in Japan.  Several members of the task force were based in Germany, but 
most of them, too, had international experience.  Bernd Sassenrath, for example, had 
worked in the U.S. for Harris in the fibers business, and Knut Zeptner had spent most 
of his time in the UK and Japan.  Peter Jakobsmeier from the corporate center 
brought in expertise on mergers and acquisitions. Reinhardt Handte was responsible 
for the specialty chemicals division of Hoechst. Unusually for such a major change 
initiative, the task force had only one external member, Wilhelm Rall, who happened 
to come from a consulting company, but “it was not a McKinsey project,” Rall and his 
fellow members emphasized.  The designated secretary of the task force, Gerold 
Linzbach, came into the team from a staff function working on mergers and 
acquisitions because Dormann valued his original thinking style. “I looked for some 
complementarities,” Dormann explained.  
 
For the next six months, each member of the team dedicated half of his time to the 
task force, while continuing to run his part of the business. The task force did 
something very unusual for Hoechst at the time: it looked outward to international 
companies in different industries to see how they were managing their operations 
around the world.  Instead of benchmarking with Hoechst’s German competitors, 
Bayer and BASF, the task force members interviewed managers in corporations like 
General Electric, ABB, Ciba Geigy, and Royal Dutch Shell.  By drawing on a far wider 
range of companies than the traditional German competition to explore best practices 
and to understand the standards these companies were setting for themselves, the 
members of the task force gained fresh perspectives on Hoechst’s operations and 
different ideas about what the organization could and should learn to do differently.   
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Dormann himself only attended the first meeting of the task force, and neither he nor 
any Management Board member intervened in the group’s work. The key message 
the task force sent to Dormann and the Board after completing their analysis of the 
data they had collected internally and externally, six months of work was that the 
company needed to have well-defined businesses and clear lines of responsibility. 
The task force recommended that 
 
• Hoechst be restructured into worldwide business units; 
• The country-level operations were to become service providers for the 
business units, and 
• The Management Board members were to focus on strategic issues rather 
than getting involved in operational matters. 
 
This recommendation entailed transforming the deeply entrenched “centralist functio-
nal culture into an entrepreneurial culture,” as Claudio Sonder described it. In other 
words, as people were soon to discover, the proposed structure essentially implied 
demoting country managers from their thrones as local kings, and it implied 
drastically reducing the size and power of headquarter staff. 
 
In terms of the literature on phases in processes of organizational learning (e.g. 
Huber 1991), Dormann had carefully selected members he knew already shared his 
sense that the organization needed to learn and change, the prerequisite stage for 
engaging in learning that is often overlooked in the phase models (Berthoin Antal & 
Krebsbach-Gnath 2001).  The role of the task force was to work on the second phase 
of learning, namely the acquisition of knowledge and perspectives.  This they did by 
tapping both internal and external sources of knowledge. The members of the 
taskforce thereby laid the groundwork for awakening the readiness to learn among a 
broader range of members of the organization who had not yet been aware of the 
problems in the organization and the challenges set by international competitors.  
This illustrates the iterative movement between phases in organizational learning.  
Then, the task force moved on, with the Management Board, to disseminate and act 
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upon the knowledge it had generated about the weaknesses in the organization and 
about best practices elsewhere.   
Tackling the Power Structure  
Organizations have drawers and filing cabinets that are littered with the reports and 
recommendations written by task forces, consultants, and other well-intentioned 
agents of change.  The lesson too often learned by employees at all levels of 
organizations is that the energy they invested into providing inputs into the reports is 
wasted, little is likely to come of them in reality.  Cynicism and inertia grow from 
repeated experiences of change initiatives with little or no follow up.  Blockages occur 
particularly frequently when the recommendations require learning and change at 
senior management levels and in the culture of the organization (Berthoin Antal, 
Lenhardt, & Rosenbrock 2001).  Hoechst had experienced interrupted learning and 
change processes in recent years, so Dormann had to ensure that his Aufbruch `94 
and the recommendations of his task force did not become bogged down or lost in 
filing cabinets.  He tackled the power structure. 
Forming Powerful Coalitions  
Dormann was fully aware that organizational learning and change are not the 
outcome of heroic leadership (Badaracco 2001), but rather require leadership at 
many levels (Sadler 2001).  Therefore, he worked to ensure he had a strong power 
base above him in the Supervisory Board2, at his side in the Management Board, and 
below him in the next management levels.  Not only Hoechst insiders but also the 
German business press took note of the fact that the Supervisory Board broke with 
tradition after Dormann took over as CEO.  His predecessor, Professor Wolfgang 
Hilger, did not become Chairman of the Supervisory Board, as the previous CEOs 
had done at Hoechst. Instead, Erhard Bouillon, a former Management Board member 
with many years of experience in human resources and industrial relations at 
                                                 
2  The governance structure of Hoechst, like other German publicly owned corporations, included a 
two-tier Board. Employee representatives hold half the seats on the Supervisory Board, whose 
responsibilities include appointing the members of the Management Board and monitoring the 
work of that Board. 
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Hoechst, became the Chairman of the Supervisory Board.  The choice proved to be 
particularly significant in gaining the support of labor representatives for the major 
structural changes over the coming years.  The business press at the time credited 
Dormann with having orchestrated this unusual decision (Fischer 1995). 
 
Dormann also made significant changes in the Management Board over the first year 
and a half of his tenure, reducing it in size from 11 to 9 and later to 6 members. Six 
Management Board members were of retirement age when Dormann became CEO, 
so he used the demographic dynamics to his advantage to bring in new members 
with fresh perspectives and to shrink the Board size by not replacing all the members 
who left.  He consciously sought to bring in people he believed would be “change 
agents who saw from the outside the blocked arteries of headquarters,” as he put it. 
Not surprisingly, Dormann continued to draw on “internal outsiders” for his 
Management Board, bringing in Ernie Drew to become the first non-German 
member, followed by Claudio Sonder and he also persuaded Horst Waesche to 
return to Germany from his position as president of Hoechst in Japan. 
 
New Organizational Structure 
Another step Dormann took to implement changes was to put a new organizational 
structure in place as of January 1, 1995.  The new structure reflected the ideas laid 
out in the Aufbruch `94 speech and the recommendations of the task force. The key 
elements of the change were the restructuring of the organization into regional 
clusters, and the primacy assigned to business units.  In other words, the former 
country-based structure remained only to provide services to the business.  The large 
headquarter was streamlined into a much trimmer corporate center.  Staff were 
reassigned from control functions for the Board to service functions for the 
businesses. 
 
Dormann’s strategy for building powerful coalitions and changing the structure of the 
organization cleverly pre-empted potential sources of resistance.  The key players 
like Claudio Sonder, Ernie Drew and Horst Waesche left their roles as regional and 
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country heads when they joined the Management Board.  By giving these “internal 
outsiders” the responsibility first for analyzing the situation and recommending 
solutions, then for actually implementing those solutions, he took them out of the field 
where they could have effectively blocked the implementation of the change.  The 
arrival of these new Management Board members had another unexpected effect: 
whereas Management Board members had traditionally been responsible for a 
particular business area, regional and country heads were accustomed to thinking in 
terms of all the different business lines of the company.  Over the subsequent years, 
they changed the nature of Management Board discussions from turf defense by 
individual members to a broader view of the company as a whole. 
Maintaining the Learning Momentum: Keeping the Sense of Urgency Alive 
It is not enough to trigger learning in organizations.  A key management challenge is 
to maintain the learning momentum.  The energy for generating and implementing 
new knowledge and approaches, for making new structures and procedures work, 
has to be renewed.  Here, again, Dormann and his team challenged conventional 
management wisdom.  Instead of imposing internationally the procedures developed 
at headquarters, they imported ideas from subsidiaries and adapted them to work for 
the rest of the company.  One tool in particular was helpful in keeping the sense of 
urgency alive in Hoechst, the Strategic Management Process. 
 
After the Task Force submitted its proposals, Dormann dissolved it and assigned its 
members to key responsibilities for delivering change. Besides promoting several of 
these senior managers onto the Management Board, he asked them to launch the 
Strategic Management Process, a technique for assessing businesses and for 
allocating resources that Dormann had observed working very well under Drew at 
Hoechst Celanese.  There was the danger that managers would perceive and resist 
this initiative as the imposition of American ideas, so the choice of experienced and 
trusted managers from Frankfurt to work on the process was crucial.  Dormann 
selected Guenter Metz, the most senior member of the Management Board and 
Deputy Chairman of Hoechst, to head the Strategic Management Process 
Committee.  Metz’ colleagues characterized him as particularly adept at building 
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bridges between Germans and other cultures, between the older and the younger 
generation in the Board, and between the old and the new mindset in Hoechst. 
According to insiders, this was yet another example of Dormann’s skill at building 
powerful coalitions for change.  
He picks people who he thinks will do exactly what he has in mind, and then 
lets them do it. He thinks a lot about people. I think his abilities to observe and 
feel people out and listen to people are almost unique. 
The managers evaluated the 35 major business units of Hoechst and placed them in 
three3 categories: 
 
• Invest (show potential for growth, driven by technology)  
• Reinvest (good earnings producers worth reinvesting in to maintain position) 
• Cash-generators (businesses that made money with little further investment) 
 
Such a comprehensive approach was new to Hoechst.  “This was the first time in the 
history of the company that such a rigorous strategic evaluation of all businesses was 
conducted under the same parameters,” remembered a manager.  Drew described 
the process and the findings of the first exercise in 1994-95. 
They were very strict performance criteria. So, if you didn’t perform (and at 
that time over 80% of the businesses did not meet the minimum criteria for 
performance in their categories) they were required to develop a plan for how 
to meet the criteria within three years. Or they had to change to a different 
category. 
 
Another novelty for Hoechst managers was the requirement to include benchmark 
data in their analysis and planning process as of 1995-6, in order to compare their 
business with that of key competitors.  The benchmarking analysis became an 
instrument to achieve Dormann’s goal of cracking through the internal focus of 
                                                 
3  In Hoechst Celanese the Strategic Management Process applied a fourth category (“sell”) but 
when Hoechst first introduced the process world wide, there was no intention to divest any 
businesses, so the fourth category was not used.  The analysis later proved that Hoechst did in 
fact have activities it needed to sell. 
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Hoechst managers. Until that point, if anything, then only Bayer and BASF, the 
traditional German competition, had been considered relevant.  Few Hoechst 
managers had experience in developing business strategies.  In the past, they had 
submitted marketing strategies, or budget plans that essentially extrapolated from 
past performance.  Many managers needed coaching through the new process by 
members of the Strategic Management Process Committee and often by external 
consultants as well in the beginning.  The incentive to deliver solid strategies was 
high.  Drew reported succinctly: “We said, ‘you are not going to get any capital 
approvals unless you have a valid, approved strategy.’”  Annual milestone checks 
were scheduled, and the impact was dramatic, because, as Harris explained, 
“The Strategic Management Process, to the extent that it shone spotlights on 
businesses that were grossly under-performing, produced crises in those 
businesses.” 
That sense of crisis stimulated a willingness to change and improve the business. 
The picture that emerged from this analysis revealed to the Management Board 
members that 
“A lot of the businesses were not up to speed, too small, not enough 
technology, not enough critical mass, the cost base was too high. We had 
done a lot of things. We had stretched ourselves too much in the past, so we 
were mediocre in a lot of things, but not good or top in even a few things.” 
The striking thing about the Strategic Management Process is that it was nothing 
particularly flashy or complex.  It was a relatively simple tool for acquiring knowledge 
about the company.  The benchmarking dimension of the process generated know-
ledge about competitors that enabled the Hoechst managers to interpret and 
evaluate their situation in light of external standards.  The knowledge acquired, 
interpreted and shared among managers in the course of rigorously applying the 
Strategic Management Process guided action and maintained a sense of urgency for 
the organization to keep on learning.   
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Changing the Knowledge Base 
The Strategic Management Process revealed some hard facts about the overall 
condition of the business that made the Hoechst managers realize they had to do 
things differently, and do different things.  They also had to recognize that they would 
have to stop doing some things in order to be able to survive.  One of the senior ma-
nagers summarized the conclusion from the process of acquiring knowledge about 
the condition of the various businesses and comparing them to the competition: 
Dormann discovered that he had too many sick businesses and could not 
bring them all back to health. He had to choose those that had the highest 
potential for profitability and low cyclical dependence. 
Hoechst had to learn how to change its knowledge base in order to compete with the 
best in the world, and this entailed learning how to let go of businesses it could not 
afford to keep investing in.  So the decision was: focus and divest. 
Learning to Leave Old Skills Behind: Divestments  
Hoechst had experience in acquiring companies, but for the first time it had to learn 
how to divest itself of businesses.  The first major divestment process began in the 
1990s.  The foray into cosmetics, which Hoechst had added to its diverse portfolio in 
1968 ended relatively painlessly because this business was peripheral for the 
Hoechst tradition and culture.  The divestment procedure continued, cutting ever 
closer to the core activities and identity of the company.  Within the next years a 
variety of businesses were spun off or sold.  There were intense negotiations 
involving the labor representatives in the businesses located in Germany, in order to 
protect employee interests as far as possible.  The most difficult decision to take was 
when Hoechst shifted away from its chemical roots.  It sold its specialty chemicals 
business to Clariant in July 1997, thereby divesting itself of the business on which the 
company had been founded.  Somewhat more than a quarter of the 40,000 
employees in Germany at the time went to Clariant.  Industrial chemicals were spun 
off as well when it was decided in 1998 that Celanese, which Dormann had been so 
instrumental in acquiring, the company that had injected American change managers 
into Hoechst, was to be divested.  Hoechst managers undertook the divestment 
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process as an active leadership responsibility, not only negotiating conditions for 
them but also sharing their future: Handte went with his employees to Clariant and 
Sonder took his into Celanese.  
Acquiring new skills and competencies 
The top management concluded from the Strategic Management Process that 
Hoechst had to focus on pharmaceuticals, a decision that implied acquiring new 
knowledge and competences.  The company had to learn how to get products into 
the largest market in the world, the U.S., and it had to learn how to use new research 
techniques, specifically bio- and gene technology.  Therefore, in parallel to divesting 
itself of some businesses, it started acquiring knowledge by buying companies that 
already had the knowledge Hoechst needed.  The most significant investment made 
soon after Dormann became CEO was the acquisition of the Kansas-based 
pharmaceutical company Marion Merrell Dow (MMD) for $7.1 billion in March 1995. 
With this move two goals were pursued: 
1. To boost Hoechst's access to the U.S. market, and 
2. To gain experienced managers of international calibre. 
 
Dormann had already learned through the acquisition of Celanese in the 1980s how 
to draw on the skills embedded in an acquired company.  He had brought 
experienced managers like Drew and Harris into Hoechst from Celanese rather than 
replacing them with Hoechst managers.  Marion Merrell Dow also had several key 
players who soon took leadership roles in the new global health care company, 
Hoechst Marion Roussel (HMR).  Dormann put it very simply: “We bought Marion 
Merrell Dow to get access to Dick Markham and Frank Douglas, who are a powerful 
tandem.” Markham brought a great deal of experience in the industry from his twenty 
years at Merck before joining the Board of Directors of Marion Merrell Dow. Within 
Hoechst, he became head of the entire pharmaceuticals business. Dormann valued 
Markham’s ability “to think how big pharma thought, to make big ideas happen, and 
to build an innovative machine.”  Douglas, originally from Guyana, brought 
complementary skills. He came with an M.D., a Ph.D. and eight years of experience 
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at Ciba Geigy, where he had had a brilliant career. He assumed worldwide responsi-
bility for pharmaceutical research within Hoechst.   
 
From these senior managers and their colleagues, Hoechst was to learn not only 
how to improve its sales and marketing, but also how to radically reform its research 
and development processes in order to become more successful in generating 
innovative products and getting them approved.  The newly acquired American 
managers also strengthened the resolve of Dormann and his change team to 
continue down the route they had embarked on, because they brought in a 
management culture with a clear message: “Focus, focus, focus!” 
 
In order to achieve the vision of becoming one of the top three suppliers in the world 
and generate an above-average return on capital employed, Hoechst needed to 
develop several competencies it had not previously built on.  Most important among 
these were the ability to develop new drugs and obtain approval fast, and the ability 
to deal with critical international financial analysts. 
Reorganizing Research and Development into Drug Innovation and Approval 
Hoechst was a research-driven company. It was proud of its research tradition, and 
had maintained a higher level of investment into research than many of its 
competitors. However, top management had come to recognize that spending large 
sums on research did not automatically lead to the launch of large numbers of 
innovative products. The member of the Management Board responsible for the 
pharmaceutical division, Karl Seifert, admitted to a journalist at the time, 
We were always one of the first companies to come up with new chemical 
entities, such as the ACE inhibitors, but always one of the latest on the market 
with them. (Koberstein 1996: 3). 
When Markham and Douglas arrived in Frankfurt in 1995 with their new global 
responsibilities for pharmaceuticals and for research in Hoechst they both saw a 
need to make significant changes that would entail shifting the mindset about the 
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purpose of research in the organization.  One step was to establish research as a 
global function, and to get people thinking in a global manner. 
The orientation back then was still of a German company, a company 
dependent on the German market with a few outposts, as opposed to a global 
company that happened to have its headquarters in Germany. 
Markham felt that global thinking needed to become embedded throughout the entire 
process of getting new products to the market.  He wanted to move the thinking away 
from the approach of getting new products “approved in Germany and then somehow 
piece something together to try to get it approved in Japan and the United States” 
towards the goal of 
developing the product from the beginning with the idea that we are going to 
submit it in all the regulatory agencies worldwide on the same day, and to get 
it approved as close to simultaneously as possible. 
Another significant step was the decision to move the core of late stage development 
to Bridgewater, New Jersey, "in an effort to capture the crosswinds of where research 
was happening, in the world's largest market,” Dormann explained. A close look at 
the range of projects undertaken by researchers in Hoechst revealed that the 
function suffered from a similar problem as had been uncovered across the whole 
company during the Strategic Management Process. Markham found that the 
research and development function of the pharmaceuticals division  
was working on too many things and the resources were spread too thin to get 
anything done well. When we began, there were over 70 projects in 
development. We did a prioritization and kept 25 out of the stock and stopped 
about 50. We just stopped funding them. A miracle happened: the 25 all 
started moving faster in a more consistent way and the result now is that we 
have one of the better pipelines in the industry. 
Considering that it takes an average of 12-15 years to develop a new drug and bring 
it to market, and that the pre-tax cost of developing a new drug has risen from $500 
million in 1990 to close to $750 million in 2000, focusing on carefully selected 
projects is a crucial determinant of return on investment in research. As Markham 
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pointed out, “deciding what you’re going to do is easy; deciding what you’re not going 
to do is the hard part.” 
To tackle this challenge, Douglas introduced a rigorous and participative process to 
evaluate projects. Researchers had to present their projects to their peers and to an 
external panel, which then decided which projects to pursue and which to drop. In 
order to achieve maximum buy-in for the outcome, Douglas asked the researchers 
themselves to design the evaluation process, insisting only that he have a veto right 
on the names of people selected for a review panel, and that six items be addressed 
in the presentation: 
• The scientific data 
• The hypothesis 
• The data to support the hypothesis 
• The time from the last milestone to the next milestone 
• The critical question that needs to be asked 
• The commercial assessment of the attractiveness of the project 
 
Having ensured that a robust and transparent process was in place, Douglas 
never once made a comment on a project. I left it to the external panel and the 
internal panel to comment. No one could say that I had a favorite project that I 
wanted to maintain, or that I didn’t like a project. 
The goal, as a French research director put it, was to have a “seamless value chain 
from research to marketing.” To achieve that goal Douglas took a significant symbolic 
step in 1997 that had very practical implications. He changed the name of the 
function from the traditional label “Research and Development” to “Drug Innovation 
and Approval.” “Why did I do that? To start the dialogue,” Douglas explained. He had 
observed that 
people were very focused on science. They were focused on doing experi-
ments. But they were not focused on asking the question ‘will this experiment 
tell me whether this component or this project is likely to lead to a drug?’ They 
were not asking the critical question.” Changing the name of the function 
caught people’s attention, and “they began to understand that we wanted 
them to operate differently. 
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Douglas recognized that changing the label implied challenging the very identity of 
researchers, and he recalled a conversation with a top scientist who asked, 
What am I going to do? I go to congresses and everyone knows me as a 
researcher. Now I have to tell them that I work in ‘Drug Innovation and 
Approval.’ I don’t know what my identity is. Douglas responded, When you can 
say to them ‘I am a drug innovator and here is the drug or the drugs that I 
have innovated and put on the market,’ I do not think that you will have an 
identity problem. 
The output over the next five years of the former research and development function, 
in its new guise of Drug Innovation and Approval, was to prove Douglas right.  Such 
management disciplines as targets, milestones, and accountability, were new to 
Hoechst researchers, who initially deeply resented the cultural change that the 
introduction of these ideas implied.  And, they felt that having to accept changes from 
American managers who had been acquired from MMD, a company that had no 
research track record, was adding insult to injury. A Management Board member 
recalled the mood: “German researchers, the elite of the world – to give them a 
foreign manager, and an African-American one at that! That was really tough.”  
Douglas himself pointed out that “it is not usual for an African-American person to be 
at this level in America either.”  He had Dormann’s support, however, and was valued 
as “an eternal revolutionary who can pick out the most valuable ideas from a whole 
sea of ideas.”  Douglas earned the respect of Hoechst researchers when the 
changes he implemented bore fruit, but the road was rocky for several years. 
 
The learning process that Markham and Douglas led in Hoechst to develop a new 
knowledge base challenged the conventional wisdom that had built up in the com-
pany over many years.  But they both emphasized that the concepts they introduced 
into the company were not particularly new or complicated, just “good standard 
management practices”.  They were not running after the most recent management 
fads or fashions; they simply brought into the organization practical ideas and 
routines that had worked well for them elsewhere.  Their management style was 
effective in stimulating learning in the pharmaceutical division of Hoechst and its 
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research labs because they gave people responsibility for working out how to apply 
the ideas in their context.   
Learning to deal with international financial markets 
Dormann’s decision to make Hoechst a global leader generating “an above-average 
return on capital employed” required, according to his views, increasing the exposure 
of Hoechst to Wall Street investors in the United States. The traditional relationship 
between German companies and their shareholders had not prepared Hoechst 
managers for the demanding nature of international financial markets.  Dormann had 
set in motion some awareness and learning about financial markets in the 1980's, in 
order to move the finance department beyond the traditionally German approach of 
solid accounting, but this thinking had not yet spread into the organization. The 
institutional investors on Wall Street expected far higher returns for shareholders in 
shorter periods of time than German companies had aimed for in the past, and their 
analysts insisted on obtaining much more information about companies than the 
German companies had been accustomed to providing. 
 
Klaus Juergen Schmieder, who became CFO of Hoechst in 1996, remembered well 
the enormous impact his first exposure to the capital markets in the U.S. had had on 
him some years earlier while he was working as Treasurer of Hoechst Celanese. 
The investment bankers came in and talked to me a lot, the exposure was 
endless. I think it was the first time that I thought about the value of Hoechst. 
They showed me a graph on which market capitalization was plotted. There 
was Merck, Pfizer, and Johnson & Johnson, and all the U.S. healthcare 
companies. At the very end of it were Bayer, Hoechst, and BASF. Our 
traditional view was that ‘these are the big guys,’ because for me Hoechst was 
always this huge conglomerate with a lot of size, revenues, people, 
everything. But all of a sudden, I realized that this was not the case. We were 
second tier in terms of value. So that was a real eye opener. Hoechst must 
have done a lousy job up to that point in terms of shareholder value creation if 
we were so far behind. 
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The managers Hoechst had acquired who were experienced in the U.S. capital 
market, particularly Drew and Markham, along with Schmieder, actively worked on 
building relationships with the investment community.  They coached their German 
colleagues in how to prepare for meetings with analysts, make presentations, and 
how to respond to penetrating questions. Waesche remembered the learning curve 
he had to go through in dealing with 
the analysts, 30-year-olds who ask all kinds of questions, no holds barred. 
That was something new for the German culture. They were totally foreign to 
us – but what we did know was how to deal with the unions. 
The latter skill proved crucial throughout the transformation process in the European 
locations, but first Hoechst needed to learn how to get the analysts to understand the 
company. 
 
Dormann and his team appeared to have learned very rapidly how to communicate 
with the analysts. They and their corporate strategy at first earned high praises from 
the investment community. By 1998 one analyst wrote, 
Since taking charge of Hoechst AG in 1994, Mr. Dormann has won rave 
reviews for putting Hoechst, the huge chemicals conglomerate through a 
breathtaking alchemy ...  Analysts repeatedly praised the strategy as bold, 
brilliant, and fundamentally ‘Anglo-Saxon’ in its hard-headed focus on profit 
(Andrews 1998: 11). 
The market value of Hoechst more than doubled between 1994 and 1996 – but 1997 
was a difficult year and Hoechst managers had to continue working hard on their 
organizational learning curve. 
The Role of “Misty Vision” in Organizational Learning 
The past decade has generated a flurry of academic publications, consulting projects 
and corporate brochures on vision (Dierkes, Marz & Teele 2001).  The conventional 
wisdom has built up quickly, telling leaders that it is their responsibility to provide a 
clear vision to guide their companies into the future (e.g. Grossman & King 1993; 
House & Shamir 1993).  Dormann and his colleagues discovered that a vision is not 
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something a leader can or should deliver top-down and fully-fledged.  Instead, it is 
something that emerges and undergoes clarification and change over time, 
particularly in turbulent environments.  The Hoechst management took the path of 
working out the vision and adjusting their thinking to the circumstances.  It is a 
messier and sometimes more confusing process because there are twists and turns 
in the road forward, but it is a more realistic approach to leadership.  Piers Ibbotson 
of the Royal Shakespeare Company calls it leading and learning by working with a 
“misty vision” (Berthoin Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath 2002; Berthoin Antal & Dierkes 
forthcoming). 
 
When Dormann took the helm of Hoechst in 1994 he excited the organization with 
the vision of being among the top three companies in the world in each of the 
company’s businesses.  In the Aufbruch `94 speech the pharmaceutical, agricultural, 
and industrial chemical sectors were given equal weight.  Gradually a “switch from 
optimizing the existing business to developing something really new” occurred in the 
thinking of senior managers, Hofstaetter recalled.  They discovered that they really 
had the opportunity to create new structures, develop a new vision, try out new 
strategies, and change the culture of the organization.  After a while, it emerged that 
Hoechst could achieve its goal of being among the top three only by focusing on 
certain businesses and leaving others, and pharmaceuticals promised to produce the 
highest returns.  Then in 1997, during the very period in which Hoechst was 
disappointing its shareholders, Dormann announced that it was becoming a “life 
science company.”  The concept created an umbrella for focusing on the 
pharmaceutical and the agricultural business and using biotechnology and genetic 
engineering as sources of innovation – and it implied a major shift away from the 
chemical industry roots of Hoechst.  
 
The sense of vision being the outcome of an emergent process was shared by many 
of the top managers. As Schmieder said, 
I think as we moved forward things kind of developed. At least, that’s the way I 
look at the process, that we were on a journey to discover what was lying 
ahead. I don’t think that we had this preconceived vision. 
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Nevertheless, many managers, including Schmieder, had a feeling that Dormann’s 
capacity to envision the future was greater than that of other senior managers in 
Hoechst. “Maybe Dormann had [the life science vision], but he never articulated it.” 
Some managers believed that the ability to see ahead, but not to push the 
organization faster than it could handle the new ideas, was a particular strength of 
Dormann’s. “He very skillfully allowed the organization and the people to learn,” 
observed a senior manager in Japan. 
 
External factors also contributed to the shift to a life science vision. The creation of 
Novartis was definitely noticed by people in Hoechst.  The positive response of the 
capital markets to Novartis, created through the merger of the two major Swiss-
based pharmaceutical companies, Sandoz and Ciba Geigy, in 1996 and to the label 
life science did not go unnoticed in Hoechst. Their managers believed that their 
businesses were undervalued and would remain so unless they reconfigured them to 
meet the new market signals.  The label life science was attractive for several 
reasons. The chemical industry, including Hoechst, had experienced a number of 
environmental accidents in recent years, so it needed to move away from activities 
and labels that were associated with pollution.  The other possible terms, like 
biotechnology or genomics, had negative associations in Europe at the time. 
 
Life science was also a useful label because of its fuzziness.  There is no agreed 
definition of exactly what it includes, so it enabled Hoechst to “retain some diversity. 
It could retain all of the elements of the large diversified chemical-pharmaceutical 
industry that might conceivably apply to the use of biotechnology and later 
disciplines,” speculated a molecular biologist who had close interactions with 
Hoechst over twenty years.  Dormann also saw the fuzziness of the term as an 
opportunity. Speaking to 120 top executives of Hoechst at the Corporate Conference 
in Boston in October 1997 he pointed out that, 
The life sciences concept has become quite popular in the investment 
community because it is believed to be the strongest driver thanks to 
innovative biotechnology, growing demand, and global dimensions. But, 
surprisingly enough, there is no clear understanding or definition of what a life 
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sciences business consists of. … Therefore, we have to create our own 
individual concept for the Hoechst Group. 
Hoechst appeared to be well positioned to compete at the leading edge of life 
science.  The acquisition of Marion Merrell Dow had given the pharmaceuticals 
division “the necessary critical mass”, as Hofstaetter put it. Hoechst had also been 
building a strong presence in the crop science area through its joint venture with 
Schering, AgrEvo, created in 1994.  Acquisitions had further grown that business 
area as well.  The crop science field, however, was not without its problems. The 
future of the market for the products was unclear and in Europe there was skepticism 
about the environmental safety and the actual need for genetically modified products. 
Early on, protesters sabotaged an experimental field with genetically modified 
rapeseed.  In addition, within the academic and business communities doubts started 
to emerge about the usefulness of the shared platform. The markets and the 
distribution were too different for synergies to occur at that end of the process, and 
even researchers were becoming skeptical because, “if there is a commonality, it 
rests in the very earliest stages of research.” 
 
Soon, the ability of the life science model to deliver the value it promised started to 
be questioned.  Reviewing Hoechst’s disappointing results a year after the 
introduction of the life science vision, the business press commented, 
More embarrassing yet, Hoechst is being upstaged by defiantly unrevolutio-
nary rivals, such as Bayer AG and BASF AG. Both companies have held onto 
their chemical businesses and both reported big jumps in sales and profit last 
week (Andrews 1998: 11). 
Hoechst was not alone with these problems.  Even Novartis was not to succeed long 
in maintaining the value of its combined activities under the life science label.  
Hoechst managers therefore had to continue the process of clarifying the “misty 
vision,” of trying out ideas, of adapting to realities in their search to be among the top 
companies in their industry.  
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The Impacts of “Merger-Mania” on Organizational Learning 
Organizations do not learn in a vacuum: they are affected by the moods and ideas in 
their environment.  Management trends are the outcome of various dynamics, 
including the recommendations of consulting firms (Berthoin Antal & Krebsbach-
Gnath 2001; Kieser 1997) and by the business press.  The generally shared belief in 
the pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s was that, as Novartis managers put it,  
You cannot be small and profitable. Some shark will come and make an 
unfriendly takeover. So the best defense strategy is a certain size so that 
nobody can swallow you. 
During the decade, almost thirty mergers and acquisitions took place in the industry 
world-wide, most of them as of 1994. The intention was to achieve economies of 
scale in order to be able to dedicate more resources for expensive research and 
development. A member of the Supervisory Board put it simply: 
Who can afford to put DM 1 billion [€511 million] at risk every year to bring 
enough new products to the  market? Only the first companies. It is not the 
magic figure of being number 1, 2 or 3 in the world, it is about being big 
enough to develop innovative products. 
Although the business press often tends to create management fads, some business 
journalists succeed in maintaining a critical distance to management fashions.  A few 
observed the shift in assumptions in the pharmaceutical industry, and they were 
skeptical about the logic. 
There used to be a general agreement that in pharmaceuticals not size but 
rather speed and the capacity to innovate were the most important factors. 
Now the managers of the British partners Glaxo and Smithkline are telling us 
that size is a precondition for speed. ... The argument of ‘critical mass’ is 
overstated. Looking back at the significant innovations from the 1970s and 
1980s, they did not come from the labs of the leading companies ... but rather 
from the medium sized actors like the Swedish Astra, or the British Glaxo, 
which did not need to make any acquisitions between 1958 and 1993. 
(Hofmann 1998, our translation). 
25 
Hoechst was definitely affected by the pressure to grow via mergers and acquisitions 
during the 1990s, and, as discussed above, it became quite skilled at learning from 
and with its new partners.  Towards the end of the decade, Hoechst managers 
wanted to find a partner that could guarantee a significantly greater presence on the 
large and particularly profitable U.S. market because Hoechst continued to be a 
relatively small player there, even after the acquisition of MMD.  By the late 1990s 
the relative size of American competitors made it impossible for Hoechst to find an 
equal, but strong, partner in the United States.  A senior German strategic planner, 
Juergen Lasowski, recalled that  
Companies like Merck and Pfizer had a market capitalization of between $100 
and $200  billion, whereas Hoechst had a market capitalization of $20 or $25 
billion. So for them it would have been very easy to absorb Hoechst, just to 
take it over. 
However, most of the German top managers found the idea of a merger with an 
American company unattractive.  They feared that “Hoechst would disappear if it 
merged with an American company, including the site and everything.” The prospect 
of being a junior partner in a merger was not acceptable to Hoechst.   
 
In November 1998 rumors started emerging in the business press that Hoechst might 
merge with the French multinational pharmaceutical corporation, Rhône Poulenc.  
The company had been nationalized by the French government in 1982, and had 
been reprivatized eleven years later, in 1993. Since that time Rhone Poulenc had 
been busy separating its life science activities from its industrial chemicals business, 
and it had been forming joint ventures and making acquisitions to strengthen these 
businesses. For example, in 1994 it had acquired the remaining 49% minority interest 
in the Institut Mérieux (and renamed it Pasteur Mérieux Serums and Vaccines); in 
1995 it had acquired the UK-based pharmaceutical company Fisons; in 1997 it 
bought the remaining 32% interest in its principal subsidiary Rhône-Poulenc-Rorer; 
and in the same year it also created Mérial, a joint venture with Merck. In 1998 
Rhône Poulenc had operations in 160 countries and 65,180 employees worldwide, 
net sales of 13.2 billion Euros and an operating profit of 1.3 billion Euros. 
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Many Hoechst employees who heard about the rumors were “frankly speaking, not 
thrilled” as one research manager put it.  Although they recognized that the speed of 
mergers and acquisitions in the industry was making Hoechst “a medium sized 
company in an environment of eat or be eaten,” the idea of undertaking a new 
merger was associated in the minds of many employees with the prospect of further 
cutbacks in Hoechst operations.  The business press was skeptical as well.   
A merger with Rhône-Poulenc would mean that two lame pharmaceutical 
producers that have both fallen back in the global competition would try 
together to attain the top of international rankings. (Frankfurter Rundschau 
1998, our translation).  
Nevertheless, on December 1, 1998 Dormann and Jean-René Fourtou, the CEO of 
Rhône-Poulenc, held a press conference in Strasbourg to announce their intention to 
create “a merger of equals.” The two men spoke of the respect they had gained for 
each other over many months and they were confident that they could combine the 
strengths of their two companies to be a leader in the life science field. They intended 
to complete the sale of the remaining industrial activities over the course of the 
following two to three years. The names Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc would vanish, 
to be replaced by a freshly minted one: Aventis. Instead of pursuing a merger with an 
American partner, the two companies had chosen a 'European solution,' so the new 
company would be headquartered neither in Paris nor in Frankfurt-Höchst, but in the 
city that houses the European Parliament for fifty percent of every year, Strasbourg. 
This choice was an important symbolic move.   
Continuing Learning Challenges for Aventis 
Finding a partner and orchestrating an international merger was only the first step in 
the next phase of organizational learning.  Hoechst and Rhone-Poulenc would have 
to learn to create a new identity and a new culture together in order to achieve the 
targets set for Aventis.  Among the challenges they would face together were:  
 
• Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc brought to the merger debts that added up to 
more than DM 20 billion [€ 10,23 billion]. 
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• Both had an operating profit that was far below that of the industry’s top 
players. Hoechst reported 9% and Rhône-Poulenc 15%, while the top players 
generated 20-30%. 
• In order to put enough innovative products into the pipeline to produce the 
returns expected by its shareholders, Aventis would have to become more 
skilled than its progenitors had been in identifying potential breakthroughs and 
rapidly bringing them to market. This would require more than speeding up 
drug innovation and approval by applying cutting-edge technologies and by 
managing parallel processes efficiently. Increasingly, it would mean spotting 
potential innovations, often in small start-up companies anywhere in the world, 
and developing effective alliances with these organizations whose cultures are 
very different from that of a large multinational corporation. 
 
The literature distinguishes between individual and organizational learning, and the 
coming years would test the extent to which the senior managers at Hoechst had 
succeeded in embedding their learning into the organization.  The top management 
team of Aventis bore little resemblance to the Management Board Dormann had 
worked with during the transformation process. Drew had left Hoechst in 1997 and 
returned to the U.S., Sonder was the CEO of Celanese, Schmieder was the CEO of 
Messer Griesheim. Others, too, had moved on. Dormann himself, and several close 
colleagues, were approaching the mandatory retirement age for senior management.  
Would the organization prove able to identify and develop the calibre of managers 
needed for the future? Had the organization become too dependent on Dormann’s 
reputed ability to “hold 7000 curricula vitae in his head” and his skill at putting 
together teams of people with complementary views and competencies?  
 
Back in 1993 Dormann had used an unusual metaphor to capture his belief that 
change must be managed as a never-ending process. 
Put up tents, not palaces with thick walls and complicated rituals. Tents that 
you can hear through, and that can easily be taken down and pitched 
elsewhere if necessary. (Dormann 1993: 1068, our translation). 
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In 2000 he was still committed to “continuously trying to open this company to 
become more transparent, more flexible, and more international.”  According to this 
management philosophy of change, not only the form, but also the content might 
change. In the first annual report for Aventis, published in the Spring of 2000, 
Dormann and his French colleague Jean-René Fourtou were already hinting that the 
life science concept as an umbrella for synergies between pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture might be temporary, and a year later Aventis sold its crop science 
business to Bayer, thereby becoming a pharmaceutical company.   
 
Dormann and his team had brought Hoechst a long way since 1994, but they still 
faced some fundamental organizational challenges in 2000.  For example, how to 
manage the tension between the need for flexibility of structures, processes and 
content on the one hand, and the need for continuity, on the other, so that the 
organization would not exhaust itself in change and lose its sense of orientation?  
Considering the speed of change in the industry, what would a vision look like that 
could provide both a long term orientation for management, employees and other 
stakeholders, while also enabling the required adaptability to permanent and 
profound changes in the environment?   
 
Aventis faces yet another key learning challenge, in common with other global 
corporations: how to build relationships not only with shareholders but also with 
multiple stakeholders.  During the 100 years of Hoechst, the company had developed 
very strong roots in Germany and an identity in different locations around the world.  
As a new organization that has relocated its research facilities and headquarters and 
closed down operations in old locations, Aventis must learn to re-connect with the 
societies in which it is operating.  Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc had strong reputa-
tions as good corporate citizens in Germany and France—will Aventis learn to 
become a good corporate citizen of the world?  
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Drawing out the learning from the transformation of Hoechst to Aventis 
What can others learn from the transformation of Hoechst to Aventis?  There are 
conclusions to draw for theory building that can also be applied to practice in 
organizations.  The case reinforces some of the fundamental concepts of organi-
zational learning while challenging others and demanding considerable modifications.  
The processes the company underwent are particularly relevant for the numerous 
companies that have longstanding international operations and now face the 
challenge of having to learn what it means to think and behave as a global player.  
Many of the lessons learned from the case are also applicable to different kinds of 
large bureaucratic organizations, including those in the public sector. 
 
The transformation of Hoechst to Aventis illustrates the classical model of double 
loop learning (Argyris & Schön 1978), whereby the very identity of the organization is 
questioned and redefined.  Usually the literature positions single loop learning as 
incremental and double loop learning as revolutionary, but the Hoechst case shows 
how a change that ends up as a dramatic transformation can occur in an evolutionary 
manner.  The literature also tends to portray knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995) as a separate process from single and double loop learning, but the case of 
Hoechst illustrates how the development of a new knowledge base is closely 
intertwined with double loop learning. 
 
Among the key concepts that the case reinforces is the role of unlearning, that was 
introduced by Hedberg (1981).  This concept is often referred to in the literature, but 
it is rarely operationalized.  The case demonstrates the effectiveness of a specific 
form of unlearning long-held assumptions about the nature of the business and the 
measures of success, namely divestment.  By letting go of traditional areas of 
expertise, an organization can free itself from activities and perceptions that hamper 
its ability to focus on and develop new knowledge bases and ways of working.   
 
Furthermore, the analysis clearly supports the recent move in organizational learning 
theory away from focusing on top management (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; Berthoin 
Antal, Dierkes, Child, Nonaka 2001).  It illustrates that a range of actors on different 
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levels are involved in shaping the direction for learning and in implementing the new 
knowledge creation processes.   
 
Hoechst’s transformation also provides insights into the role of time in organizational 
learning.  The literature generally assumes that “learning takes time,” without offering 
more precise indications of time scales (Weber, Berthoin Antal 2001).  The Hoechst 
case illustrates the factors reducing the time requirements in organizational learning, 
most particularly the significance of creating a sense of urgency and the role of 
windows of opportunity.   
 
Closely related to the theoretical contributions on the role of time in organizational 
learning are the modifications the case offers for the field’s understanding of triggers 
for organizational learning.  The traditional literature lists crises, a change in top 
management, and the emergence of new market opportunities as key stimulants to 
learning.  In this case, learning started in a pre-crisis or even, as perceived by some 
actors and observers, non-crisis situation.  The drop in profits recorded in the early 
1990s in the pharmaceutical was not a generally shared cause for concern.  Many 
managers, including some of the most senior executives, did not feel that the 
situation required significant action, because they were used to cyclical downturns in 
the business and believed that the company would ride out these difficulties just as it 
had weathered others in the past, pointing to the advantages of a diversified portfolio 
to balance out the overall returns of the corporation.  The new constellation of 
leaders at the top of the company, however, did believe that the dip in profits was 
more than a passing concern and they set about creating a sense of urgency in the 
organization, documenting the size of the problem and setting clear, high 
performance targets for all the businesses.  They maintained a momentum for imple-
menting change by developing and using a number of “windows of opportunities” for 
the various steps in the transformation process. 
 
Modifications must be made in theoretical conceptions relating to the role of visions 
in organizational learning (Dierkes, Marz & Teele 2001).  The Hoechst experience 
contradicts the expectation that the most effective vision is a clearly defined one, and 
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it defies the conventional wisdom that it is the role of top management to formulate 
this vision (alone or with expert consultants).  Instead, the case shows the 
effectiveness of a misty vision outlined by the CEO that is clarified over time in 
collaboration with other managers and in light of developments in the organization’s 
environment.  Even after the task force had completed its analysis and recommen-
dations, the vision remained to some extent fuzzy, allowing for adaptation to future 
situations without losing its power to coordinate, focus and motivate employees’ 
perceptions and behavior.  The role of the leader is to shape but not to be the sole 
inventor of the vision, and to draw into the process the managers who will be 
responsible for implementing the vision.   
 
The case breaks new ground in our understanding of organizational learning from 
acquisitions and from the periphery of the organization.  It also highlights the need to 
study processes of organizational politics in organizational learning.  The literature on 
mergers and acquisitions indicates that companies often cite the generation of 
knowledge synergies as a key objective. However, the desired outcomes are rarely 
achieved because the acquisition is not adequately treated as a process of 
organizational learning (Leroy & Ramanantsoa 1997, Vermeulen & Barkema 2001).  
The case of Hoechst to Aventis illustrates that the realization of synergies is only one 
type of learning goal, and a potentially more powerful one is the stimulation of double 
loop learning to create a different organization.  This entails explicitly including the 
search for potential agents of organizational learning when considering an acquisi-
tion, and creating platforms for those individuals to work in constellations that will 
enable them to challenge the conventional wisdom of the organization.   
 
The case shows how important it is for organizations to tap into their periphery in 
order to trigger learning at the core.  By drawing on its “internal outsiders” (Berthoin 
Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath 2002), such as people in subsidiaries or acquisitions, or 
from functions that have not traditionally dominated the organization’s decision-
making, an organization benefits from fresh perspectives on its strengths and 
weaknesses and new ideas on what it could be doing.  These “internal outsiders” are 
well positioned to make change happen because they know how the systems work, 
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and they can therefore use the systems in order to transform them.  The fact that 
such a tradition-bound company as Hoechst was capable of envisioning and imple-
menting its transformation essentially only with insiders suggests that there is a far 
greater potential for learning in many traditional organizations than is generally 
suspected.  Might it also imply relegating external consultants to a more appropriate 
marginality? (Berthoin Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath 2001).   
 
The topic of power in organizational learning has received too little attention in the 
literature to date.  It has been treated as a kind of dirty secret that is only starting to 
come out of the closet relatively recently (Berthoin Antal & Dierkes forthcoming, Filion 
& Rudolph 1999, LaPalombara 2001). The Hoechst-Aventis case allows glimpses 
into coalition building processes for organizational learning, highlighting the im-
portance of attending to power relations at multiple levels of the organization simul-
taneously in order to secure the willingness to learn and the ability to implement 
learning.  In order for better theory building to develop in the delicate area of power in 
organizational learning and knowledge, academics and practitioners will need to work 
more closely together.  Only then will research be based on first hand knowledge of 
power in action.  Will enough practitioners in different kinds of organizations open 
their doors? Will enough researchers share their powers of critical reflection with 
practitioners to shed light into this darkened topic?  
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